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FOR CANADIAN MANUFACTURING THE EARLY DECADES of t h e 2 0 t h c e n t u r y 
were years of unprecedented growth but significant geographical concentration 
of production. In real terms, after adjusting for price changes, the gross value of 
production almost quadrupled between 1900 and 1926, rising from $753 million 
to $2752 million. Employment in manufacturing rose from 423 thousand to 559 
thousand, and fixed capital employed from $227 million to $1080 million. 
However, the share of manufacturing output originating in the Maritime 
provinces fell from 10 per cent in 1900, to 7 per cent in 1920, and to 4.5 per cent in 
1930.1 This paper argues that industrial retardation in the Maritime provinces in 
the early 20th century and especially the 1920s can be explained at least in part 
by the failure of Maritime power suppliers to make available centrally generated 
electrical power and of Maritime industrialists to move away from own-
generated to purchased electricity as a power source in manufacturing. These 
failures had their roots in the poor public policy decisions of Maritime 
provincial governments, who relied on market forces to encourage central power 
development and the purchased power electrification of manufacturing. But 
market forces did not encourage these developments because power producers 
and manufacturers in the Maritimes did not have the same incentives as those in 
central Canada to extend and utilize purchased power and hence reap the 
productivity gains available to the regional economy. Public policy therefore 
failed in the sense that in the Maritimes political and legislative decisions 
maintained the status quo of existing relationships in electricity demand and 
supply, whereas in central Canada and especially in Ontario, political, legislative 
and institutional innovation opened up new avenues for electrification and 
industrial development. Market failures, uncorrected by government initiatives 
and policy, doomed the Maritime industrial sector to natural obsolescence and 
to relative decline in the 1920s. 
By reworking the manufacturing census compilations, Canadian economic 
historians have developed reliable data on manufacturing growth in Canada 
from around 1870 through to the 1930s.2 By 1900 manufacturing accounted for 
1 The data quoted is from M.C. Urquhart, "New Estimates of Canadian Gross National Product, 
1870-1926: Implications for Canadian Development", in R. Gallman and S. Engerman, eds., 
Long Term Factors in American Growth (New York, 1986) and S.A. Saunders, The Economic 
History of the Maritime Provinces (Fredericton, 1984), p. 85. 
2 Most notable perhaps in G. Bertram, "Historical Statistics on Growth and Structure of 
Manufacturing in Canada, 1870-1957", in J. Henripin and A. Asimakopulos, eds., Conference on 
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21 per cent of gross national product and despite booming agricultural and 
resource sectors in the economy strengthened this contribution to 24 per cent by 
1940. Early 20th century industrialisation lifted Canada to second place (behind 
the United States) in a worldwide ranking of industrial production per capita by 
the 1950s.3 This industrialisation, or new industrialism, had a number of striking 
characteristics which distinguished it from its 19th century counterpart.4 It was 
built with sophisticated science based technology (largely transferred to Canada 
via direct foreign investment) rather than on simple mechanical technology 
under local ownership. It most commonly used electricity purchased from 
central electric stations as its power base rather than direct own-generated water 
or steam power. It involved a large change in industrial structure, with growth 
concentrated in new, technologically sophisticated industries in the chemical, 
electrical, metallurgical, mineral, machinery and transportation equipment 
sectors rather than the food, vegetable and textile products sectors. And it was 
geographically and economically concentrated, having larger plants, fewer firms 
per industry and a tendency to locate in central Canada.5 
The dimensions and consequences of the Maritime industrial lag in non 
forest-based sectors of manufacturing in the 1900-1940 period are well 
documented. In the late 19th century, both eastern and central Canada had 
shared in the industrialisation process of the old industrialism, based on local 
ownership, coal, steam, iron and textiles, even though Maritime growth rates of 
non-forest based manufacturing output were below those of central Canada. 
Between 1880 and 1910 the Maritimes recorded an average annual real growth 
rate in this sector of 2.3 per cent compared with 4.3 per cent in Canada as a 
whole. In the Maritimes, these years of healthy growth were followed by the 
sluggish growth rates of only 1.3 per cent per annum on average 1910-1939, and 
by a growth rate of only 0.3 per cent per annum on average in the 1920s. In 
contrast, manufacturing growth in central Canada accelerated through the 
1900-1930 period, with the 1920s recording an average annual growth rate of 6.1 
per cent.6 
Statistics 1962 (Toronto, 1964). See also, J. Dales "Estimates of Canadian Manufacturing 
Output by Markets, 1870- 1915" in ibid, and D.M. McDougall, "Canadian Manufactured 
Commodity Output 1870-1915", Canadian Journal of Economics, 4 (1971), pp. 21-36. The latest 
reworking of these data, with intercensal year estimates, is M.C. Urquhart, op. cit. 
3 A. Maizels, Industrial Growth and World Trade (London, 1963), p. 31. 
4 The term "new industrialism" comes from W.T. Easterbrook and H. Aitken, Canadian Economic 
History (Toronto, 1958), ch. 21. 
5 The pulp and paper industry was also a product of the new industrialism but it tended more 
towards own generation of power and dispersion through central and eastern Canada. The 
Maritimes, of course, did sustain growth in the forest based economy, especially in pulp and 
paper, and growth rates in this sector were not as low, but this paper focuses on the other 
industrial sectors and on why performance in those sectors was so weak. 
6 The source of the data in this paragraph is D. Alexander, "Economic Growth in the Atlantic 
Region, 1880-1940", Acadiensis, VIII, 1 (Autumn 1978), pp. 47-76. Alexander cites as his 
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These data show aggregate trends but hide two particularly serious conse-
quences of these trends. First, the relative slowdown in diversified, non-forest 
based industrial growth in the Maritime provinces was devastating to Maritime 
living standards relative to the rest of Canada. David Alexander has demon-
strated that if manufacturing in the Maritimes had grown at the national rate in 
the 1880-1940 period, assuming no other sector would have grown slower, total 
gross regional output per head would have been 77 per cent of the national 
average in 1910 and 84 per cent in 1939, reflecting a convergence in regional 
living standards, rather than the diverging 67 and 55 per cent actually recorded.7 
Second, Maritime participation in the industries of the new industrialism, 
beyond pulp and paper, was particularly limited. Industries which survived in 
the Maritimes were largely traditional and resource based, such as fish products, 
butter and cheese, sawmills, flour and grist mills, and sugar refining.8 Those 
which failed to develop were the new and technologically sophisticated 
industries upon which Canada came to rest much of her comparative advantage 
in manufacturing in the 20th century: electrochemicals, electrical products, 
transportation equipment and machinery. Indeed, fully two-thirds of all 
Canadian innovation in manufacturing as measured by the numbers of patents 
issued, a sign of competition strength, was in these four new sectors by the 
1950s.9 
The literature on the spatial and structural nature of Canadian industrialisa-
tion in the 1900-1940 period is, like the industrialisation itself, regionally 
specialised. At least three hypotheses have been proposed to explain Maritime 
industrial decline and another three to explain central Canadian industrial 
development. Unfortunately, few parallels have been drawn between these 
literatures. 
Until recently the hypothesis explaining the slow growth of the Maritimes 
favoured by economists was the inevitability hypothesis, which argues that the 
Maritime provinces were doomed to industrial failure due to low productivity, 
low demand for industrial goods, and low urbanisation relative to central 
Canada.10 This hypothesis has recently been questioned by Maritime historians. 
primary source the statistics in The Maritime Provinces in Relation to the National Economy of 
Canada (Ottawa, 1948). 
7 Alexander, "Economic Growth in the Atlantic Region", p. 73. 
8 And in addition, in Saunders' words, "a large number of small plants producing speciality goods 
which can be transported long distances at a cost relatively low to the total value, and other 
manufacturing products for which proximity to the local market affords a natural protection". 
S.A. Saunders, "The Maritime Provinces" in H.A. Innis and A.F.W. Plumptre, eds., The 
Canadian Economy and the Depression (Toronto, 1934), p. 128. 
9 O.J. Firestone, "Innovation and Economic Development: The Canadian Case", Review of 
Income and Wealth, 18 (1972), pp. 399-420. 
10 This hypothesis is most closely associated with Saunders and Keirstead. See Saunders, The 
Economic History of the Maritime Provinces and B.S. Keirstead, ed., The Theory of Economic 
Change (Toronto, 1941). 
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In its place, they offer a view that the roots of Maritime industrial decline were in 
central Canadian corporate and public policy decisions (or lack of them).11 Of 
political decisions, regional transportation policy has been singled out as of 
particular importance.12 Of corporate decisions, case studies in the iron and 
steel, coal and banking sectors have appeared.13 A third hypothesis tends to 
downplay the role of national transportation and other policies, and argues that 
the poor performance of Maritime industry can be blamed on local decision-
makers, particularly entrepreneurs, who were deficient in education, initiative, 
innovation and management skills.14 
There are difficulties in accepting any of these views as an adequate 
explanation for Maritime retardation. The economists'inevitability argument is 
circular. The inevitability thesis asks the question: why did the Maritimes fail to 
industrialise? Answer: because it had low productivity, low demand for 
industrial goods and low urbanisation. There is, however, a causality problem in 
this explanation — the question and answer could be reversed. Question: why 
did the Maritimes have low productivity, low demand for industrial goods and 
low urbanisation? Answer: because it failed to industrialise. The factors cited are 
symptoms rather than causes of weak industrialisation. As John Dales has 
argued, the size of the market or urban centres cannot be cited as a determinant 
of the location of an entire industrial structure in the same way as it can the 
location of any particular industrial plant.15 The size of the market and the 
existence of urban centres are a creature of industry, through the existence of an 
industrial labour force and infrastructure. Moreover, the level of productivity is 
almost certainly a creature of the size of the market and urban centres, through 
economies of scale at the plant and industry level and general agglomeration 
economies.16 What we need to know is why the agglomeration of an industrial 
11 See, particularly, T. W. Acheson, "The National Policy and the Industrialisation of the Maritimes: 
1880-1910", Acadiensis, I,2 (Spring 1972), pp. 3-28 and "The Maritimes and Empire Canada" in 
D.J. Bercusen, ed., Canada and the Burden of Unity (Toronto, 1977), pp. 87-114; and D. 
Alexander, Atlantic Canada and Confederation: Essays in Canadian Political Economy 
(Toronto, 1983). 
12 E. Forbes, The Maritime Rights Movement 1919-27: A Study in Canadian Regionalism 
(Montreal, 1979), and "Misguided Symmetry: the Destruction of Regional Transportation 
Policy for the Maritimes" in Bercusen, ed., Canada and the Burden of Unity, pp. 60-86. 
13 D. Frank, "The Cape Breton Coal Industry and the Rise and Fall of the British American Steel 
Corporation", Acadiensis, VII, 1 (Autumn 1977), pp. 3-34 and J. D. Frost, "The 'Nationalization' 
of the Bank of Nova Scotia, 1880-1910", ibid., XII, 1 (Autumn 1982), pp. 3-38. 
14 R. George, A Leader and a Laggard: Manufacturing Industry in Nova Scotia, Quebec and 
Ontario (Toronto, 1970). 
15 J. Dales, Hydroelectricity and Industrial Development: Quebec 1898-1940 (Cambridge, 1957), 
ch. 8. 
16 This point was recognised by George, A Leader and a Laggard, ch. 3. George found that Nova 
Scotia plants had lower labour productivity than Quebec or Ontario ones because average plant 
size was smaller. At the same size of plant, productivity was similar in the three provinces 
according to George's calculations. Therefore the existance of low labour productivity was not a 
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structure took place in central Canada and "deglomeration" of an industrial 
structure took place in the Maritimes. Hence, the inevitability thesis based on 
demand, productivity and labour availability and using the neoclassical 
economic model of the locational choice of a single plant is inadequate for the 
serious study of Maritime de-industrialisation.17 
The poor public policy view explored by some Maritime historians has 
opened up a more promising research program, but also has some weaknesses. 
Transportation costs could not have been of fundamental importance since they 
are more important to single plant location than to the location of an entire 
industrial structure. Transport costs are an important barrier to industrialisa-
tion in a peripheral region, but the question is why did such a region become a 
peripheral region in the first place and another region the central region? The 
existence of a Maritime industrial economy, with its population and incomes, 
would have made the Maritimes more central and would have lessened the 
importance of transportation costs to other markets. The proximity and cost of 
transport to outside markets cannot explain British, New England, or central-
Canadian industrialisation any more than it can explain Maritime de-
industrialisation. Similarly, there have been some case studies demonstrating 
that corporate policy was an important factor in explaining the failure of 
particular firms and plants in the Maritimes, but a general conspiracy against 
the location of industry in the Maritimes is hard to fathom. 
The poor local control hypothesis seems to provide an interesting approach 
but as formulated is vague and quite untestable. Most scholarly attention has 
been directed to the quality of Maritime entrepreneurship. But damning to the 
hypothesis is the fact that the same charges of inept entrepreneurship have been 
levelled at the Canadian manufacturing sector in this period, and thus the 
hypothesis cannot used to explain intra-Canadian manufacturing development 
— unless of course it is charged that Maritime industrialists were particularly 
inept, a difficult charge to accept.18 
Three hypotheses dominate the literature on central Canadian industrialisa-
tion. The Faucher-Lamontagne hypothesis is a supply-side view which argues 
that Ontario developed into Canada's heavy industrial heartland because of its 
proximity to American coal and iron ore deposits, and Quebec into Canada's 
industrial sweatshop because of its abundant and therefore cheap and docile 
factor hindering industrialists from opening plants in Nova Scotia. Indeed, lower wages at equal 
productivity gave Nova Scotia a distinct labour cost advantage. 
17 The lack of commercialised agriculture is often cited as a reason for weak Maritime 
industrialisation, both because of low rural incomes and hence demand for industrial goods and 
because of an inadequate level of food supply to support urban populations. But this factor did 
not impede Quebec industrialisation, which found output demand and food supply elsewhere in 
Canada, as could, I suspect, the Maritime provinces. 
18 See K. Levitt, Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporation in Canada (Toronto, 1970) and 
R. T. Naylor, The History of Canadian Business 1867-1914 (2 vols., Toronto, 1975). 
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labour.19 Modern staple theorists have challenged this view and replaced it with 
a demand-side one: Ontario had a large market for manufactured goods due to 
heavily commercialised agriculture and developed industrially by this linkage. 
In Quebec, industries developed which could take advantage of low labour costs 
but could still locate a long distance from Ontario and western markets: light 
manufacturing industries producing goods with high value to weight ratios.20 In 
a third hypothesis, Dales has argued that abundant hydroelectricity was a 
prerequisite and a powerful catalyst to the 20th century industrial revolution in 
central Canada.21 Endorsing this view, Easterbrook and Aitken state: "In no 
means to be overlooked...is the support which cheap hydro power has given to 
general manufacturing development. The concentration of industry and popula-
tion in the St. Lawrence lowlands, for example, would be inconceivable without 
hydroelectricity".22 
Either the Faucher-Lamontagne thesis or the rival demand based hypothesis 
might be acceptable except for the fact that the Maritime provinces failed to 
industrialise even though they met the conditions of these hypotheses. Under the 
Faucher-Lamontagne thesis the Atlantic region should really have been 
Canada's industrial heartland since it had both abundant coal and iron ore and a 
distinct wage cost advantage. Of course, the Maritimes could have been held 
back by poor public policy such as transportation policy. But the fact that the 
hypothesis must escape refutation by noting extenuating circumstances under-
mines the credibility of the hypothesis. Under the demand based hypothesis, the 
Maritime provinces would also have been expected to develop a low wage 
enclave industrial sector exploiting imperial markets, especially under the 
Preferential Tariff, and markets in central and western Canada. Again, 
extenuating circumstances such as high transport costs have to be brought in to 
rescue the universality of the hypothesis. But transportation costs could not 
have been that significantly greater. At least, any higher transport costs faced by 
Maritime manufacturers vis-à-vis Quebec manufacturers might have been offset 
by lower costs for inputs such as coal and iron ore. 
Dales' hydroelectricity hypothesis argues that it was the existence of 
hydroelectric power resources along with agricultural and industrial raw 
material bases which explains the growth of industry in central Canada. Quebec 
and Ontario's abundant hydroelectricity made up for their deficiency in coal and 
iron ore and gave them their industrial boost once long distance transmission of 
19 A. Faucher and M. Lamontagne, "History of Industrial Development", in J-C. Falardeau, ed., 
Essays on Contemporary Quebec (Quebec, 1953). 
20 J. Isbister, "Agriculture, Balanced Growth and Social Change in Central Canada since 1850: An 
Interpretation", Economic Development and Cultural Change, 25 (1977), pp. 673-97; J. 
McCallum, Unequal Beginnings: Agriculture and Economic Development in Quebec and 
Ontario Until 1870 (Toronto, 1980). 
21 J. Dales, "Fuel, Power and Industrial Development in Central Canada", American Economic 
Review, Papers and Proceedings, 43 (1953), pp. 181-93. 
22 Easterbrook and Aitken, Canadian Economic History, p. 526. 
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hydroelectricity became technologically feasible in the early 20th century. This 
view is endorsed in the two major Canadian economic history textbooks of the 
last 30 years.23 Dales argues that a region will industrialise if it has at least 50 per 
cent of the material base — food, raw materials and power — necessary to 
sustain an industrial structure. The logic is that if the region has less than 50 per 
cent, it must import the majority of its requirements, and will be facing a cost 
disadvantage to another region that has to import only a minority. Hence, the 
other region over time will become the industrial one. The development of 
hydroelectric power in the early 20th century quickly gave central Canada the 
material base to become industrial. 
It was not Dales' intention to try to explain Maritime industrialisation or 
de-industrialisation. However, under his criteria for the existence of an 
industrial structure the Maritimes had the necessary material base in the 19th 
century and hence an advantage over central Canada. Deficiencies in agricul-
tural resources were made up for by coal and iron ore, and the latter advantages 
explain the development of the Maritime industrial structure of the late 19th 
century. But in the 20th century the Maritimes did not lose its resource 
advantages in coal and iron ore and should still have recorded industrial growth, 
since industrial regions will be any regions that must import only a minority of 
their resource needs. Examples of other non-hydroelectric regions that re-
mained industrial in the 20th century such as New England, Great Britian and 
the Rhur come to mind. Dales' hypothesis then is a convincing argument for 
explaining central Canadian industrialisation but cannot explain Maritime 
de-industrialisation. Extenuating circumstances again have to be brought in. 
Dales'argument may, however, be reformulated. The electrification hypothe-
sis proposed in this paper has two parts. First, it argues that electrification of 
manufacturing based on purchased power was a phenomenon important 
enough to explain relative regional industrial development. Second, it argues 
that there were Maritime lags in the development of central electrical power 
systems and in the conversion of industrial plants to utilize purchased electrical 
power. The structure of economic incentives and the political and legislative 
atmosphere present in central Canada were favourable to the early and 
widespread distribution of centrally generated electric power and to the 
industrial switchover from a reliance on own-generated power to a reliance on 
purchased power. These developments allowed Ontario and Quebec to develop 
high productivity industry exploiting the technologies of the new industrialism. 
On the other hand, the structure of economic incentives and the political and 
legislative atmosphere present in the Maritime provinces dictated limited 
development of centrally generated power and the continued reliance on own 
generated power in industry. Without the development, promotion and 
utilization of centrally generated power, Maritime industry was unable to 
23 Ibid, and W. L. Marr and D. G. Paterson, Canada: An Economic History (Toronto, 1980), 
pp. 368, 392. 
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transform from the requirements of the old industrialism to the requirements of 
the new and the Maritimes lost ground in the 1920s. 
Fundamentally, electrification based on purchased power allowed manufac-
turing productivity, the amount of output to be obtained from given inputs, to 
increase significantly. It is no coincidence that significant increases in North 
American manufacturing productivity occurred in the 1920s when the industrial 
power switch from direct drive based on own-generated power to unit drive 
based on purchased power was largely completed.24 As Rosenberg has stated: 
"The sharp productivity rise in the American economy in the years after World 
War I owed a great deal, directly and indirectly, to the electrification of 
manufacturing".25 Electrification was therefore probably crucial to regional 
industrial performance. Of course, other factors would have affected regional 
productivity growth and industrial performance. The creation of managerial 
hierarchies and their control over labour, the vertical integration of production 
and distribution, the integration of financial and industrial control, local 
resources and industrial mix, and local research and know how were obviously 
important. But electrification brought many of these factors into play. 
It has been documented how electrification of manufacturing proceeded in 
the early 20th century.26 Direct drive of all machinery from a central factory 
power plant, with its attendent belts and pulleys, was initially replaced by line 
shaft drive. Then, through World War I, line shaft drive was replaced by group 
drive, with strategically placed electric motors driven themselves by transmitted 
power from the central power plant. Unit electric drive with a motor placed on 
each machine and driven by purchased electricity available at the flick of a 
switch rather than from a factory powerplant slowly became the industrial norm 
by the end of the 1920s. Sixty-two per cent of power utilized in Canadian 
manufacturing was purchased by 1929, up from 45 per cent in 1923. In the 
Maritime provinces, these figures were 28 per cent in 1929 and 7 per cent in 
1923.27 
These progressive steps in the electrification of manufacturing had three 
significant productivity-boosting effects in transforming industry. Chandler has 
emphasised the role of electrification in fostering the development of "high 
speed, large batch, continuous process production methods, with new machines 
and an intensified use of energy enabling an integration and coordination of the 
24 J. Kendrick, Productivity Trends in the United States (New York, 1961); A. Woolf, "Electricity, 
Productivity and Labor-Saving: American Manufacturing 1900-1929", Explorations in Eco-
nomic History, 21 (1984), pp. 176-91. 
25 N. Rosenberg, "Technological Interdependence in the American Economy", in N. Rosenberg, 
ed., Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 78-9. 
26 See R. DuBoff, "The Introduction of Electric Power in American Manufacturing", Economic 
History Review, 20 (December 1967), pp. 509-18; W. Devine Jr., "From Shafts to Wires: 
Historical Perspectives on Electrification", Journal of Economic History, 43 (1983), pp. 
347-72. 
27 See the data sources listed in footnote 71. 
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faster flow of materials through the production process".28 Electric drive, 
especially unit drive, enabled an increased flow of production (in Chandler's 
words, velocity of throughput and in the words of a Canadian engineer of the 
1920s, "an increase in the units produced per unit of time"), an improved 
working environment, an ease of plant expansion and vastly improved 
organisational and engineering control.29 The cost reducing effects reaped can 
be described as economies of speed — more inputs processed per unit of time 
with the same capital equipment. Rosenberg puts it in the following way: 
The reduced cost of power alone did not exhaust the productivity benefits 
of electricity. The social payoff to electricity would have to include not only 
lower energy and capital costs but also the benefits flowing from the new 
found freedom to redesign factories with a far more flexible power source 
than was previously available under the regime of the steam 
engine....Although the direct energy-saving and capital-saving effects 
(included, it should be noted, a vast saving of floor space) were great, the 
flexibility of the new power source made possible a wholesale reorganisa-
tion of work arrangement and, in this way, made a wide and pervasive 
contribution to productivity growth.30 
The managers of Dominion Cotton Mills of Montreal, in describing their 
decision to switch to purchased electricity in 1908, noted that: "Considering the 
interest and depreciation on a steam plant, the cost of the rental of electric power 
was no more than steam would have cost" and that electric power would provide 
"all that could reasonably be expected in the way of flexibility, centralisation of 
control, reduction of attendence and minimisation of stoppages together with an 
ability to make up for delays by running any desired section overtime".31 
As hinted at in the above remarks, the conversion of North American industry 
to run on purchased power also served to reduce long-run capital requirements 
in manufacturing as factory installed power generating equipment was 
scrapped.32 Canadian observers in 1932 reported that: "The central supply 
utility renders large capital outlays for power by manufacturers unneccessary, 
and fills their requirements at lower annual cost".33 More importantly, as Devine 
explains, "electric unit drive was an extremely flexible technique for driving 
machinery, and because of this flexiblity, manufacturers could turn their 
attention away from problems of power production and distribution and toward 
28 A. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business 
(Cambridge, 1977), p. 285. 
29 Engineering Journal, July 1930, p. 428. 
30 Rosenberg, "Technological Interdependence in the American Economy", p. 77. 
31 Quoted in Dales, Hydroelectricity and Industrial Development, p. 100. 
32 See R. DuBoff, Electric Power in American Manufacturing 1899-1958 (New York, 1979). 
33 Industrial Canada, January 1932, p. 101. 
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improving the overall efficiency of their operations".34 Hence, more output for 
less inputs, and more attention to the production process per se. 
Finally, although electrification did not promote investment in power plant 
equipment in manufacturing (that was undertaken in the central electric 
stations), it did promote another type of investment in manufacturing — the 
investment in new plant and equipment to utilize purchased power. In this new 
plant and equipment was embodied new technology presenting new possibilities 
for productivity gain. Good examples were electric motors, electric furnaces, 
electric steam heat boilers, electric ovens, apparatus for electric arc welding, and 
electric lighting and materials handling systems.35 All of these new techniques 
probably increased productivity. Twentieth century metallurgy and industrial 
chemistry increasingly relied on electricity as a material input in electrolytic 
methods, as a source of power to drive machinery, and as a source of heat to 
transform materials. Indeed, the electrification and mechanisation of industry 
was linked; just as Canadian manufacturing expansion and its electrification 
was peaking in 1929, so was new capital expenditure.36 Much of the new 
technology of the second industrial revolution was designed to use electricity 
although there was not a wholesale shift away from other energy forms. 
The importance of the availability of purchased electricity to Canadian 
manufacturing then went far beyond its use as a cheap energy input (its direct 
cost saving effect). It had a profound impact on the technology of production, 
altering the optimal mix of inputs and improving overall efficiency through 
organisational change on the factory floor. Electrification based on purchased 
power, because of its many indirect cost reducing effects, probably accounted for 
much of the manufacturing productivity improvement that was recorded in the 
Canadian economy of the early 20th century. By 1929, 83 per cent of all electric 
motors utilized in Canadian manufacturing, and 55 per cent of all motors 
utilized in Maritime manufacturing, ran on purchased rather than on own-
generated electricity.37 Given the importance of reliable electricity supply in 
operating the new continuous process production technologies, the primary 
considerations of the manufacturer with respect to purchased power were, 
ranked in order of importance, continuity of supply, adequacy of supply for the 
present and future, and only finally cost.38 However, the structure of economic 
incentives and the geographical, political and legislative impetus for the 
development of central power systems and for the conversion of industrial 
plants to run on purchased power differed in the Maritimes and in central 
Canada. 
34 Devine, "From Shafts to Wires", p. 368. 
35 Industrial Canada, January 1929, p. 98. 
36 T.R. Vout, "The Canadian Manufacturing Industry 1900-1957", in J. Beach and J. Weldon, eds., 
Conference on Statistics I960 (Toronto, 1962), pp. 295-314. 
37 See footnote 71. 
38 Engineering Journal, April 1924, p. 180. 
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Central power systems in western market economies must be seen as cultural 
artifacts, their development conditioned by local geography, economics, prop-
erty ownership, politics and legislation. The technology of central power 
production was internationally known and available, but how it was applied in 
each region was governed by local conditions.39 Bottlenecks to development 
were rarely technological but more often political, economic, geographic and 
legislative. 
Economics and geography combined to present very different incentives in 
different regions to build and expand central power systems. In regions where 
coal was abundant, waterpower scarce and hence thermally generated electricity 
the norm, the supply of power could be adjusted easily to demand and hence 
thermal stations were built to operate at full capacity in the more heavily 
populated, typically urban areas. Since plants were built to meet local demand 
only, system expansion was not aggressively pursued. Local markets, especially 
if monopolised, were guaranteed. An owner of a thermal plant built to operate at 
full capacity had no particular incentive to promote his activities and expand his 
production, aside from incurring the fixed capital cost of building new plants. 
Increased production with existing plant meant operating at a less efficient 
higher output level, and hence meant increasing price to cover costs. Faced with 
competitors, he would not have wished to do this. More likely, if possessing a 
local monopoly, he would have restricted output and increased price to 
maximise profits. 
In abundant waterpower regions, supply of power could not so easily be 
adjusted to demand. Supply was determined by the nature of the hydropower 
site and demand had to be adjusted to supply.40 With large supplies of power 
available, hydropower companies aggressively sought markets to bring demand 
closer to capacity supply and to reap economies of scale, given the high ratio of 
fixed to variable cost.41 An owner of a hydro plant operating with excess 
capacity had a large profit incentive to increase production and lower per unit 
costs. He was faced with the happy prospect of promoting his product, being 
able to lower his costs and hence prices, beating his competitors, and probably 
increasing his profits. On the other hand, the high initial cost of hydro plants, 
and the risk that the present and future demand for their power (in order that 
they could run close to capacity) might not materialise could have held back the 
private development of waterpower sites. This was less of a problem for thermal 
generation, given the much lower ratio of up front to operating cost. On 
economic grounds, private development of thermal capacity might be expected 
39 T. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society 1880 -1930 (Baltimore, 1983), 
esp. ch. 1. 
40 Dales, Hydroelectricity and Industrial Development, pp. 10-11. 
41 C. V. Christie, in "The Cost of Hydroelectric Power", Engineering Journal, April 1924, pp. 
177-80 argues for an 80/ 20 ratio of fixed to operating costs for hydro plants and a 30/ 70 ratio for 
steam plants. 
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to have occurred quickly but expanded more tentatively. Private developers of 
hydro capacity would have been more tentative in making initial investment 
decisions, but would have marketed their power more aggressively once 
committed. 
The local political and legislative milieu also played a role in central power 
development in the early 20th century. In regions where governments were 
suspicious of large organisations, consolidations and mergers, or of the need to 
supplant the market through public power provision, and extolled instead the 
virtues of competitive private enterprise, the development of large, regionally 
integrated power systems was held back. Prominent examples were the failure to 
interconnect power supply in Great Britain in the 1920s, the failure of the Giant 
Power movement in the United States, and the failure in the 1920s to develop 
power at Muscle Shoals in the Tennessee Valley. In the British case, interconnec-
tion was difficult due to the very atomistic and competitive structure of private 
power ownership. The United States Giant Power movement failed because of 
an ideological controversy over ownership and control. The first World War 
period had seen interconnection of private utility systems in the United States — 
as Hughes states "war accelerates négociations between interests which in 
peacetime might work for years with little or no physical co-ordination" — but 
peacetime power interconnection and public power management was too much 
like socialism to gain support in the 1920s.42 The same ideological reservations 
kept Tennessee Valley power from being developed,as a regional system by the 
state in the 1920s. Moreover, where private ownership of previously installed 
thermal generating plant existed, many governments were loath to allow new 
albeit more efficient private or publicly owned hydroelectric operations to take 
over existing markets.43 Such governments did not wish to undermine existing 
property rights and profit expectations. As Hughes argues, "existing technolo-
gies give rise to binding nuclei for a host of dependent political and economic 
interests".44 
In other regions where big government, big business and economic and 
political change were not quite so taboo and where existing property rights and 
profit expectations could be more easily undermined — for example in Ontario 
where state electricity provision was seen as a method of wresting control from 
United States interests — regionally integrated power systems grew more 
rapidly. The consolidation of operating and controlling organisations over large 
geographical areas either in the public or private sectors was often crucial to 
system building, interconnection and power supply.45 "System builders", 
Hugues points out, "knew that the diversity of load that allowed load 
42 Hughes, Networks of Power, p. 285. 
43 Governments, of course, controlled private waterpower development through the granting or 
denial of water rights. 
44 Ibid., p. 325. 
45 Engineering Journal, July 1930, p. 425. 
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management, a resulting improvement in load factor, and a lowering of unit 
capital cost was likely to be found in a large geographic area where the 
population engaged in a wide variety of energy-consuming activities".46 Some 
examples were the hydroelectric power systems created by the Pacific Gas and 
Electric Co. in California and by the Bayernwerk-Walschenseewerk in Bavaria in 
the 1920s. The latter was a grid-style regional hydroelectrification project that 
was visionary in its coupling of large scale waterpower development with 
systematic, planned regional electrification. 
In making the decision to convert plants to run on purchased rather than own 
generated power, early 20th century industrialists would have compared the 
expected discounted profit streams under the two technologies. A typical plant 
manager would have compared the operating cost of the old technology (own 
generation) with the operating and overhead cost of the new technology 
(purchased power) since the new involved the purchase of new machinery that 
the old did not. If the old was the most profitable technology, it would have 
persisted.47 In regions where coal was abundant and purchased electricity scarce, 
profit incentives often led to the decision to stay with the old technology. The 
operating costs of own thermal generation were often lower than the costs of a 
switch to purchased electricity. The industrialist chose to stay with the old 
technology on which capital cost was either fully paid off or unavoidable. On the 
other hand, in regions where coal was scarce and hence the operating cost of 
thermal own-generated power was high and where purchased electricity, perhaps 
hydroelectricity, was abundant and hence low in cost, industrialists were led to 
introduce the new technology. More generally, in many older industrial regions, 
the old technology was retained because it was there already. In newer regions, 
the most cost-efficient, best practise technology was chosen. Hence, in any 
particular regional situation, the technology most privately profitable to use 
need not be the most efficient new one. Old technology can persist for long 
periods, and regions can get caught in the trap of natural obsolescence that is 
basic to the natural market process of technical change.48 Moreover, the 
industrialist's decision to switch to purchased power often revolved around the 
perceived continuity and adequacy of supply of power, at present and in the 
future, and these perceptions differed from region to region. 
If it is accepted that the availability and use of purchased power lay behind 
much of the manufacturing productivity change and relative industrial perfor-
mance that occurred in Canada in the early 20th century, two findings would be 
necessary to allow relative regional electrification a role in explaining the 
46 Hughes, Networks of Power, p. 463. 
47 See W.G. Salter, Productivity and Technical Change (2nd ed., Cambridge, 1966), ch. 4. The 
overhead costs of the old technology is not relevant to the decision since these costs are already 
'sunk'. 
48 Even the United States was not immune to this fact. See A. Woolf, "Energy and Technology in 
American Manufacturing 1900-1929" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1980), p. 217. 
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Maritime industrial lag behind central Canada in the interwar years. One would 
be a finding of relatively slow development, interconnection and distribution of 
centrally generated electricity in the Maritime provinces compared to central 
Canada. The other would be a finding of a more continued reliance of Maritime 
manufacturers on the old technology of own-generated power rather than the 
new of purchased power. 
There is evidence on the first point. Dales has examined the role of the central 
electric station in Quebec's industrial development in the early 20th century.49 
His case studies of Quebec's major power companies clearly demonstrate that 
local economic, political and legislative factors were the determinants of 
regional power system development. For example, the Shawinigan Water and 
Power Company controlled large hydro resources and was driven by a desire to 
expand its markets, reduce its overhead costs and preempt its regional 
competition. To increase markets, the enterprise actively promoted manufactur-
ing development in its region, going so far as to set up an industrial development 
department of the company. It brought large aluminium, chemical and cotton 
textile companies into its region. Dales argues that the company succeeded the 
railway as the main development agency of central Quebec. 
Dales found the same to be true of the Southern Canada Power Company, 
supplying the Eastern Townships. Again, the company set up its own industrial 
development department. Because the hydro resources of the company were 
relatively small, large power users were not sought but rather smaller labour 
intensive manufacturing operations. The company realised that by stimulating 
textile, metal, wood, rubber and leather-working industries, population and 
urban growth were encouraged. Nightime domestic demand for lighting 
dovetailed with the daytime industrial demand for power, and helped to raise the 
load and diversity factor of power supply and utilise existing limited capacity 
much more effectively and profitably.50 In pursuing its own profit motives and 
by stimulating industry, the hydroelectric power company contributed to 
industrial development in the Eastern Townships in the 1920s. Industries were 
lured to the region by low labour costs and other attractions, but the reliability 
of power supply and the existence of an organised network of electric 
transmission lines was often the critical factor in locational choice. 
The environment in which the other power companies operated in Quebec 
was not so favourable to industrialisation. Industrial development in the 
Ottawa valley region was held back by divided Quebec-Ontario ownership of the 
river and by the self-interest of the International Paper Company, which held the 
water rights on the river and sold only to large users such as pulp and paper and 
49 Dales, Hydroelectricity and Industrial Development, chs. 3-7. 
50 The load factor of a power system is the ratio of the average to peak power demanded. The 
diversity factor is the ratio of the sum of the peak power demands of the components of demand 
and the peak power demand on the system as a whole. The wider spread are the peak power 
demands through the day, the higher are the load and diversity factors. 
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aluminium companies and not to general manufacturing. In Montreal, the 
Montreal Light, Heat and Power Company was a vested interest that initiated 
several business actions which retarded the development of the huge water 
powers of the lower Ottawa and St. Lawrence and successfully protected the 
company from competition in the greater Montreal market from power 
generated on these rivers. These actions restrained industrial development in the 
rural fringes to the west and east of Montreal. The Gatineau and Montreal 
companies showed little interest in developing markets for power because they 
possessed large and guaranteed markets already; in the case of the Gatineau, 
large long term power contracts with pulp and paper and aluminium plants, and 
in the case of Montreal, a captive urban market. Dales concluded that where 
power enterprises had to find markets to provide for growth and diversity and to 
spread fixed costs, hydroelectric firms actively encouraged the development of 
manufacturing. But this was not the case where markets were already large and 
guaranteed. 
A similar tale could be told of Ontario. The Hydroelectric Power Commission 
of Ontario created in 1906 installed its first bulk electrical power transmission 
lines to supply south-western Ontario in 1910, placing the province in the 
forefront of electrical transmission innovation. The Ontario commission went 
into operation under pressure from provincial manufacturers, who felt increas-
ingly vulnerable to volatile coal prices and hence fluctuations in the cost of 
generation of steam power. They were also reluctant to see Niagara pass into the 
hands of the Toronto manufacturing interests or to United States interests who 
were thought to have had little interest in the electrification of Ontario's smaller 
municipalities. Ontario Hydro, as Nelles put it, "met a psychic and practical 
need for cheap and immediate electricity".5' Ontario Hydro was a model in the 
active cultivation of markets for electricity and the development of manufactur-
ing. By 1922 it was operating 22 hydroelectric developments, all interconnected, 
and was pioneering in high voltage transmission in order to increase the systems 
power factor.52 The Commission engaged, in their own words, in the "wide-
spread distribution of electricity at cost to many consumers rather than just the 
supply of large blocks of power to large users under long term contracts".53 With 
low charges arid with technical advice, Ontario manufacturers were induced by 
Adam Beck's commission to introduce technologies designed to run on 
purchased power. Consumer retail markets were actively cultivated by offering 
low retail rates, raising urban standards of living and helping to promote a 
diversified industrial structure around the production of the new consumer 
5! V. Nelles, The Politics of Development: Timber, Mines and Hydroelectricity in Ontario 
1849-1940 (Toronto, 1974), p. 251. 
52 The power factor of a system is the ratio of power current to total current, and is a measure of 
power losSi 
53 The Hydroelectric Power Commission of Ontario: Its Origin, Administration and Achievements 
(Toronto, 1928), p. I. 
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durables designed to run on electricity.54 Productivity growth and marketing 
policy at Ontario Hydro promoted the use and distribution of electricity and 
accelerated the pace of development of a new industrialism in Ontario. 
The story of central power provision and manufacturing development was 
very different in the Maritimes provinces where central electricity generating 
capacity was developed much more slowly than in central Canada.55 Signifi-
cantly, many of the central stations in the Maritimes, including New Brunswick's 
and Nova Scotia's largest, were thermal steam plants. These plants had higher 
ratios of operating to overhead costs than hydro plants and did not boast 
significant economies of scale. Maritime electricity suppliers had much less 
incentive to develop new markets for their power and to persuade local 
manufacturers to scrap their generating equipment and move to purchased 
power. The large thermal power suppliers had, by and large, guaranteed markets 
in urban centres such as Halifax and Saint John, and did not seek expansion. 
The development of cheaper hydroelectric power near these cities was held back 
because of the perceived risk of investing in high up-front cost hydroelectricity 
generation where local monopolies using thermal power were well established 
and the capacity to absorb additional energy problematic.56 
Despite the formation of public power movements to develop central power 
generating capacity, especially hydroelectricity, the private utilities in the 
Maritimes were able to strengthen their monopoly positions. Public interven-
tion managed to get some hydroelectricity projects financed, because they were 
often perceived as too great a capital investment and too great a risk for private 
capital, but the projects were not designed to benefit consumers but rather the 
urban distribution companies, especially those in Halifax and Saint John. The 
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick Power Commissions sold their power to these 
suppliers on often uneconomic terms, only for them to distribute it. The major 
customers of the public commissions were not final users but private distribu-
tion companies receiving supply in bulk. The public commissions did not move 
aggressively into the industrial, commercial and retail marketing of their 
power. 
Despite public pronouncements by the provincial governments on the 
importance of hydroelectric development, the provinces were held back in the 
1920s. The local coal industry was certainly opposed, and the legislatures of 
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick failed to cooperate on any joint public 
54 This is one area where the Quebec companies are argued by Dales to have been less successful, 
possibly due to the fact that the Quebec companies were private monopolies interested in 
maximising profits rather than public monopolies designed to sell power at cost. 
55 See the discussion in Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The Maritime Provinces Since 
Confederation (Ottawa, 1926). It is interesting to note, however, that the world's first long 
distance transmission of coal-fired electrical power occurred at Chignecto, New Brunswick in 
1906. 
56 C. Armstrong and V. Nelles, Monopolies Moment: The Organisation and Regulation of 
Canadian Utilities 1830-1930 (Philadelphia, 1986), ch. 13. 
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ventures. The Grand Falls project, the public development of which was the 
main issue in the 1925 New Brunswick election, was not undertaken by the 
public commission. Rights to the development passed back to the International 
Paper Company. Having postponed development in the early 1920s, the 
company developed the site in 1927 but sold its power only in large blocks under 
long term contract.57 In 1926, staffing at the New Brunswick Power Commission 
was cut, and many of the 25 private power companies existing in New Brunswick 
in 1918, which were "...small, and some of them inefficient", survived into the 
1930s.58 Progress for the New Brunswick commission was slow, and "up to 1931 
the New Brunswick Power Commission was operating without sufficient 
generating capacity to fully develop the market served by them or to expand into 
new markets".59 
By 1929 the talk was not of what had been done in the Maritimes with respect 
to central power provision but what could be done. Installation of central 
electricity generating capacity was much below that considered commercially 
viable.60 In the early 1930s growth came, albeit somewhat belatedly. More 
attention turned to underdeveloped steam generation. The Grand Lake steam 
project of New Brunswick's Minto coal field began operation in 1931, and was 
soon "connected by high voltage transmission lines to Fredriction and 
Marysville and to the Musquash system at Moncton, thereby enabling the two 
plants of the [New Brunswick Electric Power] Commission to operate in 
parallel, one helping the other".61 Another coal fired project, the Seaboard Plant 
at Glace Bay, serving Sydney, began operation in 1930. Indeed, the early 1930s 
saw a large growth in the activities of the Nova Scotia Power Commission. From 
operating three systems in 1928 — St. Margaret's Bay, Sheet Harbour and 
Mushamush — five more were added by 1933 — Tusket, Rosemary, Mersey, 
Markland and Antigonish. High voltage transmission lines grew from 94 miles 
in 1926 to 365 miles in 1933, and power delivered from 34.2 million kilowatt 
hours In 1926 to 148.8 million kilowatt hours in 1933.62 
The Dominion Bureau of Statistics began providing data on central electric 
stations in Canada in 1917.63 Power equipment installed in central stations in 
Canada rose from 3.8 million horsepower in 1926 to 4.9 million in 1929 and to 
7.1 million in 1935. In the Maritimes, these respective figures were 80.4 
57 A. T. Doyle, Front Benches and Back Rooms (Toronto, 1976); R. A. Young, "Planning for 
Power: The New Brunswick Electric Power Commission in the 1950s", Acadiensis, XII, 1 
(Autumn 1982), pp. 73-99. 
58 Industrial Canada, January 1932, p. 128. 
59 Financial Post, 1 July 1933, p.20. 
60 Ibid., p. 20 observed that 400,000 horsepower of installed power was commercially viable in 
Nova Scotia in 1931 but only 116,000 had so far been installed. 
61 Ibid., p. 18. 
62 Ibid., p. 20. 
63 Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Central Electric Stations in Canada (Ottawa, 1917-). 
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thousand, 180.1 thousand, and 378.9 thousand horsepower. Electricity gener-
ated by central stations rose in Canada from 12,093 million kilowatt hours in 
1926 to 17,963 million in 1929 and to 23,283 million in 1935. In the Maritimes, 
electricity generated rose from 128 million kilowatt hours in 1926, to 253 million 
in 1929 and to 784 million in 1935. Hence in 1926, 2.1 per cent of all power 
equipment installed in central generating stations was in the Maritimes, but 
these stations generated only 1 per cent of centrally generated power in Canada. 
In 1929, these figures were 3.6 per cent and 1.4 per cent respectively, 
demonstrating that more stations had been built in the Maritimes but that 
comparatively little additional power was being generated and distributed. By 
1935, however, the Maritimes had 3.9 per cent of installed horsepower and 
generated 3.4 per cent of central power, at a capacity utilisation rate that was 
much closer to the all-Canadian average (2,811 kilowatt hours generated per 
horsepower of generating equipment installed compared to 3,277 kilowatt hours 
for Canada). But in the critical years of the 1920s, Maritime power producers 
certainly lagged behind the rest of Canada in generating and distributing their 
power. 
The Malay and Ruth Falls developments of the Nova Scotia Power Commission, 
supplying the towns of Pictou County through the Sheet Harbour system, 
demonstrated the importance of electricity supply to an industrial area in the 
1920s. Beginning in operation in 1925, with 55 miles of high voltage transmission 
lines, deliveries to New Glasgow, Stellarton, Trenton, Pictou, and Westville grew 
from 6.2 million kilowatt hours in 1925, at 1.66 cents per kilowatt hour, to 9.3 
million kilowatt hours in 1928, at 1.05 cents per kilowatt hour.64 Pictou County 
factories were able to keep hold of their market share in Canadian metals 
fabricating in the late 1920s, after losing ground in the early years of the 
decade.65 Indeed, the Pictou County metal firms were leaders in the Maritimes in 
the introduction of new technology based on the new industrialism and the J. W. 
Cummings Company was the first metals company in the Maritimes to invest in 
a steel foundry equipped with an electric furnace. It is interesting to note that the 
metal firms of Pictou County recaptured their lost markets in the late 1920s 
when cheap hydroelectricity and the opportunity to invest in new technology 
designed to run on reliable purchased power became available. 
On the other hand, most Maritime manufacturers, unlike J.W.Cummings and 
many central Canadian manufacturers, were not successful in introducing the 
new technologies designed to run on purchased power in the 1920s, largely 
because purchased power was not available. At the end of the 1920s and in the 
early 1930s, however, the Maritime provinces began successful industrial 
64 Industrial Canada, January 1929, p. 100. 
65 L. McCann, "The Mercantile-Industrial Transition in the Metal Towns of Pictou County 
1857-1931", Acadiensis, X, 2 (Spring 1981), pp. 29-64. This fact however attests against accepting 
without qualification McCann's view of unrelenting industrial decline in the region in the early 
20th century. 
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development around purchased power electrification.66 An industrial survey of 
the Annapolis Valley in 1929 demonstrated some of these new developments. 
Speaking of the brick and tile work of L.E. Shaw at Avonport, Nova Scotia, 
Industrial Canada reported that "the plant has been practically rebuilt in the last 
two years. Steam power has given away entirely to the electric motor....an 
adequate supply of water under pressure in all parts of the plant is now available 
by an electric pump".67 The manufacturer reported that due to a new electric kiln 
and drier capacity, output was up 40 per cent. The Annapolis Hardwood 
Company reported that their sales doubled in 1927-29 once the plant was 
electrified with fireproof dry kilns, boiler house and heating system. The 
proprietors of Cosmos Imperial Mills Limited, the principal industry in 
Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, reported "another improvement in operating condi-
tions for which preparations are now being made, is the opportunity to obtain 
hydroelectric power sufficient to operate the entire plant from the new 
hydroelectric development under construction by the Nova Scotia Power 
Commission on the Tusket River, 9 miles for Yarmouth. When this energy is 
available, it is anticipated considerable saving in power costs will be possible, as 
well as having a more flexible arrangement for the operation of machinery than 
at present, where a considerable portion of the equipment is on mechanical 
drive".6« 
To this anecdotal evidence on the lateness with which Maritime manufac-
turers transformed their operations to run on purchased power can be added 
manufacturing census evidence on the use by Maritime and central Canadian 
manufacturers of their own-generated and purchased power. The evidence 
presented deals with fuel and power costs and usage in total manufacturing and 
in the new industrialism sectors of iron and steel products, non-metallic mineral 
products, non-ferrous metal products and chemical products in the Maritimes 
and in Canada in the 1920 to 1940 period. These sectors were able to make the 
most dramatic use of the new processes of the second industrial revolution and 
the new energy source of purchased electricity.69 The experience of these 
66 Parallels could be drawn to Great Britain here. Leslie Hannah has argued that the coming of the 
National Grid, low cost interconnected electricity supply, and purchased power electrification of 
manufacturing in Britain in the late 1920s and early 1930s was the major reason for the success of 
the British industrial economy in the 1930s, just as the core of Britain's industrial problems in the 
1920s lay in the failure to build up a national power system and to electrify industry. L. Hannah, 
Electricity Before Nationalisation: A Study of the Development of the Electricity Supply 
Industry in Britain to 1948 (Baltimore, 1979) and "A Pioneer in Public Enterprise: The Central 
Electricity Board and the National Grid 1927-40", in B. Supple, ed., Essays in British Business 
History (Oxford, 1977). 
67 Industrial Canada, June 1929, p. 67. 
68 Ibid., p. 70. 
69 These are, in Chandler's terms, the industries of high speed, large batch continuous process 
production. As he states in The Visible Hand, p. 243, "in those industries where the processes of 
production required the application of heat and involved chemical rather than mechanical 
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industries in the interwar years demonstrates clearly the Maritime industrial 
problem. These four sectors made up a large and rapidly growing portion of 
Canadian manufacturing, accounting for 26.1 per cent in 1920, 33.7 per cent in 
1930 and 41.7 per cent in 1940. In the Maritimes these industries had a 32.1 per 
cent share of Maritime manufacturing output in 1920. This share, however, fell 
to 28.5 per cent in 1930, to rebound to 34.6 per cent in 1940. Moreover, as the 
Maritime contribution to total Canadian manufacturing output fell from seven 
per cent in 1920 to 4.5 per cent in 1930 and 1940, the provinces' contribution in 
these four sectors also fell in the 1920s, rebounding somewhat later in the 1930s. 
For example, the Maritime share of total Canadian output in iron and steel 
products fell from 10.6 per cent in 1920 to 4.6 per cent in 1930, rising back to 5.1 
per cent in 1940. In chemicals, the Maritimes had a 4.5 per cent Canadian output 
market share in 1920, but only 2.9 per cent in 1930. In non-metallic minerals, 
these percentages were 8.8 and 6.4 per cent respectively.70 
The proportion of industrialists generating their own power instead of 
purchasing it from central stations was much higher in the Maritimes than it was 
in central Canada. Maritime industrialists therefore failed to reap some of the 
productivity improvements inherent in scrapping their power equipment and 
moving to purchased power electric drive. Some statistics that attest to this fact 
can be gleaned from the annual Canadian industrial census after 1923, which 
records, separately, the horsepower of electric motors run on own-generated 
electricity and the horsepower run on purchased electricity in Canadian 
industrial establishments.71 Seventy-three per cent of electric motors utilised in 
Canadian manufacturing in 1923 were run on purchased power, but only 26 per 
cent in Maritime manufacturing. In 1926 these figures were 82 per cent and 33 
per cent; in 1929, 83 per cent and 55 per cent; and in 1935,85 per cent and 77 per 
cent. Purchased power electrification was certainly undertaken in the Maritimes 
but it occurred much later than in the rest of Canada. 
This pattern was similar in the four subsectors of the new industrialism. In 
methods, improved technology, a more intensified use of energy and improved organisation 
greatly expanded the speed of throughput and reduced the number of workers needed to produce 
a unit of output...in the metal working industries, the requirements of high volume output 
brought the most significant technical and organisational innovations". 
70 Data in this paragraph are taken from Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The 
Manufacturing Industries of Canada (Ottawa, selected years 1919-1941). 
71 In the annual Dominion Bureau of Statistics Census of Industry between 1917 and 1923, and in 
any decadal census before those dates, there was no separation of electric motors operated on 
purchased power and those operated on own-generated power. The following publications 
published between 1917 and 1940 were the souces for the manufacturing data discussed in this 
section: The Manufacturing Industries of Canada, Manufacturing Industries of the Maritime 
Provinces, Use of Electrical Power in the Mining and Manufacturing Industries in Canada, 
Production and Use of Electrical Energy in Canada, Manufactures of Non-Metallic Minerals in 
Canada, Chemicals and Allied Products in Canada, Iron and Steel and their Products in Canada, 
Manufactures of Non-Ferrous Metals in Canada. All Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 
(Ottawa). 
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iron and steel products, 81 per cent of electric motor horsepower utilised was run 
on purchased power in the Canadian industry, but only 25 per cent in the 
Maritime regional sub-sector. These figures were respectively 79 and 12, 89 and 
56, and 79 and 7 per cent for the non-ferrous metals, chemicals and non-metallic 
minerals sectors respectively. In 1929, these sectors in the Maritimes still relied 
much more heavily on own-generated power to run electric motors than in 
Canada as a whole, although there were some significant moves to purchased 
power electrification in the Maritime chemicals and non-ferrous metals 
sectors.72 
The census of industry also gives figures that allow for the calculation of 
purchased primary power utilised in Canadian manufacturing as a percentage of 
all primary power utilised. Primary power utilised is defined as the rated 
horsepower of factory installed primary power equipment (steam engines and 
turbines, gasoline, gas and oil engines, internal combustion engines, hydraulic 
turbines and waterwheels) plus rated horsepower of electric motors run on 
purchased power. In Canadian manufacturing in 1923, 45 per cent of primary 
power utilised was purchased, a figure that rose to 56 per cent in 1926, to 62 per 
cent in 1929, and to 66 per cent in 1935. In Maritimes manufacturing only 7.3 per 
cent of primary power utilised was purchased in 1923, only 14 per cent in 1925, 
28 per cent in 1929 and 47 per cent in 1935. This pattern was similar in the new 
industrial sectors. In 1926, in iron and steel products, only 13 per cent of primary 
power utilised was purchased in the Maritimes industry, compared with 60 per 
cent in the industry in Canada as a whole. These figures were respectively 41 and 
61, 21 and 64, and 9 and 91 per cent for the non-ferrous metals, chemicals and 
non-metallic minerals sectors respectively. 
Maritime industrialists in the 1920s did not participate to the same extent as 
industrialists in central Canada in the transformation of the workplace to 
purchased electrical power, and probably incurred considerable costs in terms of 
additional capital equipment and lost opportunities for plant rationalisation by 
not doing so. The productivity implications of this retardation in purchased 
power electrification may have been significant enough to give purchased power 
availability and use an important role in explaining the Maritime industrial 
failures of the 1920s. 
Although consideration must be given to relative electrification, one ought 
not attempt to replace a rich literature on Maritime de-industrialisation with a 
monocausal, deterministic explanation of the phenomenon. Almost certainly 
other factors were important. Indeed, the issues involved in regional electrifica-
tion can possibly form additional elements in the three dominant theses on 
72 In 1928, in non-ferrous metals products, 72 per cent of motors came to be run by purchased 
power, a figure to be compared to the 91 per cent figure for the Canadian sector as a whole. 
Chemical products records 100 per cent of electric motors run on purchased power in the 
Maritime sector by 1929. But both of these sectors were very small in the Maritimes and 
dominated by just a few establishments. 
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Maritime industrial failure: the inevitability, poor public policy and poor local 
control theses. 
There is an element of inevitability in that private economic agents acting in a 
rational manner led central Canada into the new industrialism and the 
Maritimes into an industrial dead end by making privately profitable and 
correct business and technology decisions. The same economic instincts, 
designed to maximise profits, which led central Canadian power suppliers to 
promote and central Canadian industrialists to switch to purchased electrical 
power, also led Maritime power suppliers and industrialists to proceed more 
slowly with the development and introduction of the new form of power supply. 
What is privately and socially profitable can be the one and the same, as in 
central Canada, but unfortunately can be different, as in the Maritimes. Central 
Canada had hydroelectricity sites that, if run on a large scale, could produce 
electricity inexpensively and still leave healthy profits for private suppliers or 
cover costs for public suppliers. Assured continuity of supply of cheap 
hydroelectric power, vis-à-vis high and volatile coal prices, induced industrialists 
to switch readily to purchased power and in the process to reap the productivity 
improvements (in new machinery) that came to be embodied in making that 
choice. In the Maritimes, good hydroelectric sites were more scarce and the 
economics of thermal generation was such that large output was not rewarded 
by large profits — more likely, output was restricted and expansion held back by 
the local monopoly nature of markets captive to installed thermal generating 
capacity. Purchased power availability and cost to the entrepreneur was more 
uncertain, coal was cheaper, and staying with existing power arrangements and 
the older equipment that went along with them was the more privately profitable 
choice. 
There is an element of poor public policy in that where private and social 
profitability diverge, and market solutions fail to be social benefit-maximising, 
there is a case for government intervention. Canadian governments did 
recognise the social benefits of purchased power electrification and especially 
the development of regional electricity systems built around hydroelectricity 
and thermal power. However, except in Ontario and Quebec, the extension of 
regional systems was slow. Most early 20th century governments in Canada, as 
in many other western industrial countries, were loath to intervene in markets 
for power. Ontario did so, helped by local factors such as strong personalities, a 
large visible power site and international rivalries over the development of 
Niagara power. In the Maritimes, the provincial governments were not as 
decisive in providing for power development. In part, the problem was that 
electricity supply was not a national government responsibility, and small 
provincial governments did not have the will or the financial resources to 
develop regional power systems. Since for the Maritime industrialist it was more 
profitable to stay with old equipment and own-generated power, provincial 
governments might have supplied power and offered subsidies for switching to 
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purchased power and undertaking the redesign of production facilities, 
subsidies large enough to raise the profitability of the new above that of the old. 
But in the 1920s there was no great political mood for subsidising industrialists 
for the cost of their inputs or to speed up the introduction of new technology.73 
The poor local control thesis on Maritime decline argues that "decline was not 
inevitable if appropriate actions had been taken by local interests when 
required".74 If part of the problem was the delay in electrification, industrialists 
operating in the Maritimes, industrialist holders of rights to power develop-
ments, existing power suppliers, and provincial governments can take some of 
the blame. Ex post, decisions taken with regard to electrification appear to have 
been incorrect. But decisions that in hindsight would have been more correct 
cannot be expected to have been taken by early 20th century Maritime industrial 
interests. The Maritime industrial sector was therefore doomed to a natural 
obsolescence in the 1920s. As old equipment broke down and outlived its 
usefulness, there was some catching up in the 1930s, but valuable ground already 
had been lost. 
73 Similar arguments are now being made in general terms about British industrial decline in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries. Elbaum and Lazonick argue that British governments failed to 
put in place state policies and organisational innovations that could have allowed the economy to 
escape competitive decline, relying too much on the invisible hand of the self-regulating market 
and not enough on the visible hand of coordinated control. They argue that planning was 
required at the level of the enterprise, financial institutions and the state, and that the 
consequences of this failure of state policy first became evident in the interwar period. A similar 
argument might be made with regard to the Maritimes, especially since what Elbaum and 
Lazonick argue to have impeded state intervention in Britain was the fact that a very highly 
developed industrial economy based on market forces had already evolved in the 19th century. 
The same might have been the case for the Maritime provinces where the status quo in power 
production and industrial method proved difficult to dislodge. See I. Elbaum and W. Lazonick, 
"The Decline of the British Economy: An Institutional Perspective", Journal of Economic 
History, XLIV, 2 (June 1984), pp. 567-83. 
74 J. B. Cannon, "Explaining Regional Development in Atlantic Canada: A Review Essay", Journal 
of Canadian Studies, 19, 3 (Fall 1984), p. 74. 
